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There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law
Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. In an influential article, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner introduced the concept of the
“penalty default rule,” a rule that fills a gap in an incomplete contract with a term that would not
be chosen by a majority of parties similarly situated to the parties to the contract in question.
Ayres and Gertner argued that such a rule might be efficient in a model in which contracting
parties have asymmetric information. However, Ayres and Gertner did not provide any persuasive
examples of penalty default rules; their best example is the Hadley rule, but this rule is probably
not a penalty default rule. It turns out that there are no plausible examples of penalty default rules
that solve the information asymmetry problem identified by Ayres and Gertner. The penalty
default rule is a theoretical curiosity that has no existence in contract doctrine.

Ayres and Gertner’s influential article, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules,2 introduced the concept of the “penalty default rule,”
which is a rule that fills a gap in a contract with a term that would not be chosen by a
majority of parties similarly situated to the parties to the contract in question. The
purpose of penalty default rules, Ayres and Gertner argued, is to force parties to reveal
private information, which enables their counterparts to perform more efficiently than
they would if left uninformed.
At the time Ayres and Gertner wrote their article, many law and economics
scholars believed that default rules should reflect the preferences of a majority of
similarly situated parties.3 Ayres and Gertner showed that this view is not necessarily
correct if parties have private information when they bargain with each other prior to
entering a contract. If they do, and if various other assumptions hold, then penalty rather
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than majoritarian default rules are optimal.4 Establishing this normative claim was the
main purpose of their article, and it is not my goal here to quarrel with it.5
Ayres and Gertner also made a positive claim: they argued that many default rules
are in fact penalty default rules. Their central example was the rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, a case which held that a carrier was not required to pay damages for losses
that were an unforeseeable consequence of his breach. They also cited the “zero quantity”
default rule in U.C.C. 2–201, and a handful of other doctrines.
However, on closer inspection none of the examples they provide in their original
or subsequent papers turns out to be a clear penalty default rule. The Hadley rule is
probably not a penalty default rule, and, in any event, certainly not a clear example of
one. The zero quantity default rule is not a default rule but an element of a legal
formality. The other examples in the Ayres and Gertner article are not existing legal rules
at all, but proposals for legal change. Rules cited by Ayres in subsequent scholarship as
examples of penalty default rules are not default rules but contract formation rules or
interpretive presumptions. Nor have other scholars identified clear examples of a penalty
default rule. And, in my own research, I have been unable to find a clear example of a
penalty default rule, or an example of an authoritative legal decisionmaker such as a court
or legislature endorsing a penalty default rule for reasons related to the factors identified
in Ayres and Gertner’s model. All of this suggests that there is no such thing as a penalty
default rule; penalty default rules simply do not exist or are not a distinctive doctrinal
category.
Part I of this paper recapitulates Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley analysis; Part II
looks at the doctrine. The conclusion speculates about why there are no penalty default
rules in contract law, and whether it matters.
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I. Analysis
A. Preliminaries
Default rules are rules that, in Ayres’ succinct formulation, “govern in the absence
of contrary agreement.”6 As I will discuss presently, there is confusion in the literature
about what rules count as default rules and what rules belong to other categories. To
clarify these issues, I will use the following framework. Imagine that a party claims
breach of contract, and seeks damages. The court must:
1. Determine whether contract formalities are satisfied.
2. If so, determine whether there was real consent (not fraud, duress, mistake).
3. If so, determine what the contract says.
4. If there is a gap, apply a default rule.
5. If an explicit or implied term was violated, award a remedy.
The rules that are applied at each conceptual stage have different functions and effects. In
step 1, courts apply contract formation rules such as the offer/acceptance doctrines, the
consideration doctrine, and the statute of frauds. In step 2, courts apply rules that
determine whether the parties consented, such as rules governing fraud, duress, and
mistake. In step 3, courts apply rules of interpretation, including interpretive canons and
the parol evidence rule. In step 4, courts apply default rules. In step 5, courts award
damages or other remedies.7 Thus, the focus of this paper is step 4.
Arguably, interpretive rules are analytically the same as default rules. Often
contracts have a term that can be reasonably interpreted in multiple ways. One normally
says that courts resolve ambiguities by applying interpretive presumptions, but one might
with equal accuracy say that ambiguities exist because parties fail to anticipate that the
term will have more than one possible meaning; that therefore such contracts involve a
“gap” where one would otherwise find a definition that eliminates the ambiguity; and that
courts fill the gap using a default rule. Although I will generally treat interpretive
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presumptions as their own category, in Part II.D I address the argument that they are
identical to default rules, and conclude that even if they are default rules, they are not
penalty default rules.
Because one of my arguments will be that doctrines that are frequently identified
as default rules are not default rules at all, I want to emphasize here that I am not defining
the category out of existence; there are many real default rules. The obvious marker is the
“unless otherwise agreed” phrase, which is almost always attached to a default rule but
never to other types of rules such as legal formalities and contract formation rules. Here
are a few random examples from the U.C.C.:
2–305:
2–306(2):
2–307:
2–308:
2–309:
2–310(a):
2–311(2):
2–312(3):
2–314:
2–315:

“reasonable price” if the price term is left open.
“best efforts” in exclusive dealing contracts unless otherwise agreed.
delivery in single lot unless otherwise agreed.
delivery at buyer’s place of business unless otherwise agreed.
reasonable time for delivery if delivery time left open.
payment due at time and place of delivery unless otherwise agreed.
assortment of goods is at buyer’s option unless otherwise agreed.
merchant sellers warrant that goods are free of claims of third parties unless
otherwise agreed.
implied warranty of merchantability unless excluded or modified.
implied warranty of fitness unless excluded or modified.

Indeed, virtually every section of part 3 of article 2 contains one or more default rules.
By contrast, legal formalities (step 1) such as the statute of frauds cannot be
avoided by agreement. Nor can contract formation rules (step 2: offer/acceptance, fraud).
Nor can interpretation rules (step 3). In my schema, remedial rules (step 5) simply
implement default rules that are used to fill in gaps; otherwise, they may be immutable
rules (like the penalty doctrine and restrictions on injunctions).
Ayres and Gertner’s model applies to step 4, the application of default rules. They
say little about step 3, the stage at which courts determine whether or not there is a gap. I
will say more about this step later. For now, let us focus on default rules, and Ayres and
Gertner’s chief example of a penalty default rule, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.
B. Full Information
In Hadley v. Baxendale a miller hired a carrier to transport a crankshaft. The
carrier failed to deliver the crankshaft on time. The miller was unable to operate his mill
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and lost profits—that is, incurred consequential losses. The contract itself did not have a
term that said what would happen if the crankshaft was delivered late—whether, for
example, the carrier should pay damages equal to the miller’s losses, should refund the
fee, or something else. Thus, the contract had a gap. The Hadley rule is, in essence, that
the carrier does not have to pay damages for the consequential losses unless they are
foreseeable or communicated in advance. However, if the parties choose, they may agree
in the contract that the carrier should pay the consequential losses. Thus, the default rule
is foreseeable losses; but the parties can opt out of the default—that is, fill the gap—by
agreeing to liability for consequential losses at the time that they enter the contract.
To understand Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of Hadley, one can best begin with a
simpler version of the example that they analyze. Suppose that at the time that the miller
and the carrier enter their contract, the miller values performance at some amount, V. The
valuation can be low (VL) or high (VH); let us suppose that the valuation could be either
with equal probability, and E(V) is the mean of VL and VH. The carrier can deliver using
normal care at low cost (CL) or using a high level of care at high cost (CH). When the
valuation is high, the optimal contract provides for high care; when the valuation is low,
the optimal contract provides for low care. I assume full information.
Let t refer to transaction costs, which increase with the complexity of the
transaction. If the contract does not refer to care level, transaction costs are low (tL); if it
does, transaction costs are high (tH).
If the default rule is that a carriage contract with a gap requires the low level of
care, then the carrier will offer a simple contract (with a gap) to all low types. In the case
of the high types, the carrier must choose between offering the simple contract (which
will result in inefficient care but incur only low transaction costs) or the complex contract
(which will result in efficient care but also incur high transaction costs).
If the default rule is that a carriage contract with a gap requires the high level of
care, then the carrier will offer the simple contract to all high types. In the case of low
types, the carrier must choose between offering the simple contract or the complex
contract—again, depending on the transaction costs and precaution inefficiencies.
Assuming that the cost of transacting around (tH) is the same for low types and
high types, and that the inefficiency resulting from the failure to contract around is the
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same, then the optimal default rule will just be the rule that benefits a majority of the
shippers. If most shippers are high types, then the default rule should be high precaution;
otherwise, the default rule should be low precaution.
Note that under this reasoning the majoritarian rule is not the best rule if—for
whatever reason—the transaction costs for the majority type are much less than the
transaction costs for the minority type. If for example, there are 5 high types and 4 low
types, but it costs high types $10 to opt out and it costs low types $20 to opt out, then the
default rule should be the low precaution rule preferred by the low types (assuming that
both types prefer opting out to inefficient precautions). When the default rule is
minoritarian, the majority high types opt out at a cost of $50; when the default rule is
majoritarian, the minority low types opt out at a cost of $80.
The Hadley rule is a slightly more complicated version of my low-precaution
default rule. Rather than saying that the default is low precaution, it says that the shipper
is entitled to damages that would be available to the low type. Failure to contract around
the low-precaution default rule and the Hadley rule would lead to the same result: a low
level of care. The only difference is that the carrier that engaged in the low level of care
would pay nothing under my default rule, whereas it would have to pay a low level of
damages under the Hadley rule if the low level of precaution resulted in delay.
As noted above, scholars and courts typically say that a court applies a default
rule only if there is a “gap” in the contract. This has led to some confusion because no
contract can mention all possible events, and so how can a court tell whether a gap exists
or not? The answer is interpretation. A typical contract dispute is caused by some
contingency—the goods are destroyed in transit, a strike causes a delay, and so forth—
and courts try to ascertain from the contract whether the parties anticipated the
contingency and explicitly allocated obligations in case that it occurred. If the contract
mentions the contingency and explicitly allocates obligations (“If the goods are destroyed
in transit, then...”), then the court will not find a gap. If the contract is silent, then the
court will find a gap. Many cases are ambiguous—the contract may mention a broad
class of events in which the contingency may fall, for example—and in these cases courts
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apply general interpretive canons to resolve the ambiguity. Having done so, the court
might decide that a gap does or does not exist.8
C. Asymmetric Information between Parties
Suppose there is asymmetric information. The carrier does not know the type of
any particular customer but does know the distribution of types, and thus knows E(V).
Again, optimally the carrier takes high care with high-type millers, and low care with
low-type millers. But if the carrier does not know the type of miller, he will take average
care, which is too low for high-type millers and too high for low-type millers. Too much
or too little care results in inefficiency. The inefficiency results because some parties with
private information do not want to reveal it. They do not want to reveal their private
information because if they do, then they will have to pay a higher price, and this cost
would exceed any benefit from the better level of care, because part of the cost is
externalized on other parties.
The existence of such information externalities is not a sufficient reason to
abandon majoritarian default rules. The carrier has an incentive to discover the types of
the millers and an easy way to do so. The carrier has an incentive to discover the types
because if he knows the types of millers, then he can provide optimal care, and the right
price for optimal care, undercutting competitors who fail to do so. The carrier’s easy way
to discover the types is to offer a menu of contracts—a high-price-high-care package, and
a low-price-low-care package. If the default rule is majoritarian, then the carrier can save
transaction costs by offering simple contracts to the majority type (say, low), and the
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complex contract—which specifies level of care—for the high type. The default rule
would specify low care because that is what a majority of the parties would want.
But conceivably the majoritarian default rule could be inferior to a penalty default
rule. As in the full information case, one reason might be that it is sufficiently more
expensive to write complex contracts for high types than for low types. No one has ever
explained why this might be likely; but it is a theoretical possibility.
Another reason—the focus of Ayres and Gertner—is that the information
externality is (sufficiently) higher when the minority fails to contract around than when
the majority fails to contract around. Again, there is no particular reason to think this is
so, but it is possible.
However, even if these outcomes are possible, they are not plausible. Real people
don’t divide into majority types and minority types; there is most likely a distribution of
valuations best imagined as continuous, perhaps a truncated normal curve or a uniform
distribution or something similar. If this is what the world looks like, then the
majoritarian default rule will usually favor parties with the mean valuation, or valuations
close to the mean, and disfavor parties with valuations at both tails. But there is nothing
about being at a tail in a distribution that would make it likely that the parties have
idiosyncratically high transaction costs.
A further puzzle is why, as Ayres and Gertner seem to assume, majoritarian
default rules and penalty default rules would coexist. The Hadley model is quite general,
and can be applied to any element of a contract—not just damages, but price,
assignability, location of delivery, and so forth. There is no reason to think that
information externalities pose more of a problem when parties omit a damages term than
when parties omit a price or assignment term. Default rules of the kind found in the
U.C.C. operate at a high level of generality, and are not necessarily specific to any
market.9 If Ayres and Gertner’s claim that the Hadley rule is a penalty default rule is
correct, then one would expect all general default rules to be penalty default rules. If it is
9

As Scott and Schwartz note, the default “rules” in the U.C.C. seem a lot more like general standards than
rules. They argue that such vague standards do not provide guidance and are largely unhelpful. See Alan
Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 601
(2003). I’m not sure I agree with them, but the point here is that the various default rules in the U.C.C.
apply to settings that seem, analytically, extremely similar, so it’s hard to see why some would be penalty
default rules and others would be majoritarian; given the similarity of the settings, one would expect all to
belong to one type or all to belong to the other type.
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not correct, then one would expect all general default rules to be majoritarian default
rules.
In sum, penalty default rules can be efficient relative to majoritarian default rules
but only if one makes special assumptions. These assumptions strike me as implausible,
but others may disagree. I have argued elsewhere that it would be difficult to show that
these assumptions are valid, and will not repeat that argument here.10
D. Asymmetric Information between Parties and Courts
Although the bulk of Ayres and Gertner’s original paper provides a model of
asymmetric information as between parties, they frequently justify penalty defaults on the
basis of an entirely different theory. This theory points out that courts are expensive and
fallible institutions. If a contract has a gap, the courts must lumber into action, and try to
determine the efficient term. But this is difficult and costly, so it would be better for
parties to supply the term ex ante. To encourage parties to fill gaps at the time of
contracting, courts should use penalty defaults. To avoid the bad outcomes created by
penalty defaults for the majority of parties, this majority will fill gaps, thus simplifying
the task for courts in most cases. By contrast, if people know that courts enforce
majoritarian rules, they will feel less urgency about specifying terms in their contracts,
knowing that the courts may do a good enough (even if not perfect) job.
There are two ideas here, and they must be carefully distinguished. The first idea
is that courts use legal doctrines to encourage contracting parties to provide sufficient
detail in their contract, so that judicial interpretation in case of dispute will be guided by
the ex ante intent of the parties, rather than by judicial guesswork. This idea was
advanced by Lon Fuller, who argued that legal formalities serve this evidentiary
function.11
The second idea is that penalty default rules (in addition to legal formalities) serve
the function of encouraging parties to produce specific rather than vague contracts. Ayres
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and Gertner argue that penalty default rules encourage specificity by penalizing parties—
giving them what they would not have wanted—who agree to vague contracts.
The first idea is plausible, but the second idea—that penalty default rules are the
cure—is less persuasive. As to the diagnosis, there is no doubt that in a simple economic
model, the parties have an incentive to externalize their costs on courts. One way of
doing so may be to leave gaps in their contracts in the expectation that courts will fill
them properly in case there is a dispute.
But the obvious remedy to this problem is to charge parties a fee for using the
court system. They are charged modest fees already; perhaps the fees should be higher,
and especially for contract cases. Another obvious remedy—noted by Ayres and
Gertner—is to refuse to enforce indefinite contracts. Traditionally (though less so today),
courts would refuse to enforce indefinite contracts even if they were sufficiently definite
to resolve the dispute in question.12 Thus, when parties draft a contract, they will fear
leaving a gap lest a court refuse to enforce the contract on grounds of indefiniteness—
even if the gap has no bearing on the dispute before the court—so that whichever party
who would benefit from nonenforcement could simply fail to perform, eliminating the
value of the contract.13
There is little reason to think that penalty default rules would be a remedy to the
problem of parties leaving gaps as a way of externalizing some of the cost of contracting
onto courts. Penalty default rules penalize only the majority of parties for failing to fill a
gap; but the judicial externalization problem is not caused by the majority of parties; it is
caused by all the parties—that is, both types, not just the majority type. By contrast, the
indefiniteness rule applies to all parties, just as the judicial externalization problem
requires. So does the rule that requires parties to pay court costs.
The larger point is that Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of penalty default rules—
their use of the Hadley model to identify the relevant variables for determining what the
optimal penalty (and/or majoritarian) rules should be—is irrelevant to the question of
how parties should be discouraged from externalizing costs on courts. The Hadley model
concerned how parties should be discouraging from concealing information from each
12

The doctrine was overthrown by Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641
(2003), for a valuable discussion.
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other—or, put differently, from externalizing information costs on third (contracting)
parties. Thus, the variables that are important in the Hadley model, such as the proportion
of parties that belong to the high type or the low type, are not relevant to the analysis of
how to discourage externalization of costs on courts. Thus, even if Ayres and Gertner’s
analysis of Hadley is correct, there is no reason to think that limiting damages to
foreseeable losses would result in the optimal amount of detail in the contract from the
perspective of the judicial externalization problem.
E. Summary
Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model shows that under certain parameters optimal
default rules would not maximize the ex ante value of particular contracts but would
penalize parties in order to encourage them to reveal information to each other. Drawing
on Fuller’s discussion of legal formalities, Ayres and Gertner also argue that optimal
default rules might also penalize parties so as to encourage them to write specific and
complete contracts that can be easily interpreted and enforced by courts. “Penalizing”
parties means implying terms that would not maximize the ex ante value of their
contracts.
It is worth noting that what distinguishes a penalty default rule and a majoritarian
default rule is not that only penalty default rules are information-forcing. Both types of
rule are information-forcing. A majoritarian rule is information-forcing because the
minority types will contract out of it if transaction costs are low enough, revealing both
their valuations and the valuations of the majority that does not opt out. The only
difference between the two rules is that more parties opt out of—or would prefer to opt
out of—a penalty default rule than out of a majoritarian default rule, everything else held
equal. Ayres and Gertner are correct that in imaginable cases greater opting out is more
socially valuable than less opting out, despite the expense. Indeed, in the simplest case
one doesn’t need information externalities to get this result: it is true in the very simple
situation where, for whatever reason, it is extremely cheap for each member of the
majority to opt out, whereas it is very expensive for each member of the minority to opt
out. But it is hard to think of real world examples where such differential costs hold, and
to believe that this is true at the general level at which default rules operate.
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If I am right that penalty default rules don’t promote efficiency under plausible
assumptions about the world, then it is unlikely that penalty default rules would exist.14
But everyone seems to think they exist. Do they? I now turn to this empirical question.
II. Empirics
Evaluating Ayres and Gertner’s claim that penalty default rules exist turns out to
be harder than it might appear. The problem is that many contract rules are ambiguous.
To simplify matters, I will distinguish three types of tests.
1. There are default rules that are clearly not majoritarian.
2. There are default rules that are clearly not majoritarian, and that can plausibly be
understood to incorporate the factors (cost of contracting around, distribution of
types, information externalities) identified by the Ayres/Gertner model.
3. There are default rules that are clearly not majoritarian, and that have been
interpreted, explained, or defended by legal decisionmakers in a manner consistent
with the Ayres/Gertner model.
The first test is weakest; the third is strongest. The first test would be satisfied by a
nonmajoritarian rule that was not intended to force parties to reveal information but
reflected other concerns—fairness, for example. As an aside, one might think that a good
test would be the existence of default rules that force parties to reveal information;
however, as I have already noted, because virtually all default rules force parties to reveal
information, this test would not distinguish penalty and majoritarian default rules.
I will argue that there are at best one or two cases that ambiguously satisfy the
first test, and none that satisfies the second and third.15
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I confine my analysis to general rules of contract law, and ignore family law, etc.
Proving a negative is difficult. For present purposes, it seems sufficient to focus on examples used by
Ayres and Gertner (or Ayres, in his solely authored efforts), and a few other authors. There may be penalty
default rules lurking somewhere in the common law or the U.C.C. which I miss. I also ignore several
putative examples of penalty default rules which are really proposals to change existing laws into penalty
default rules; e.g., the discussion of Lefkowitz and the lost-profits puzzle. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling
Gaps, supra, at 104–06.
In a highly unsystematic survey of articles with the term “penalty default rule” appearing
somewhere within them, I found no cases where an author claims that a general rule of contract or
commercial law is a penalty default rule (aside from the examples from Ayres and Gertner). Most of the
articles either contain proposals or hypothetical examples, or involve other areas of the law such as
statutory interpretation, legal ethics, or patent law.
15
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A. Hadley
I start with the Hadley rule, which is Ayres and Gertner’s strongest example—
perhaps their only plausible example. Still, it is not clear that the Hadley rule is a penalty
default rule. There are two other possibilities: that it is majoritarian, and that it is not
majoritarian but that it does not reflect the factors in Ayres and Gertner’s model.
The usual reason for thinking that the Hadley rule is not a majoritarian rule is that
it is counter to the notion of efficient breach. The efficient breach theory says that
contract damages should equal actual loss, so that the party tempted to breach will breach
only if the cost of performance exceeds the lost value to the potential victim. On this
view, the majoritarian damages default rule would be actual loss, for it would save the
parties the transaction costs of specifying the efficient amount of damages in case of
nonperformance. Since the Hadley rule exclude the unforeseeable portion of any loss, it
is not majoritarian.
The problem with this view is that it oversimplifies the analysis of optimal
damages rules. The decision to breach is just one of many decisions the parties may
make, and if damages for actual loss ensures that this decision is made optimally, it has
more ambiguous effects on the numerous other decisions that parties must make—the
decision whether to take precautions, to mitigate, and so forth.16
Indeed, one problem with expectation damages is that they force the breacher to
provide insurance to the victim against whatever event causes the breach. It will rarely be
the case that the carrier will be the cheaper insurer; and indeed we observe that modern
carriage contracts always limit liability—although the shipper may purchase insurance
from the carrier for an extra fee. Perhaps this insurance is frequently purchased, but one
suspects not: carriers have no competitive advantage in the insurance market. Indeed,
carrier-supplied-insurance is likely in many cases to be inferior to self-insurance. If this is
right, then most parties would want liability limited to foreseeable loss; the Hadley rule is
majoritarian.17

16

See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 629 (1988).
17
Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J.
Legal Stud. 105 (1989). The ambiguity of the Hadley rule has been noted by many scholars; including
Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale
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This conclusion is bolstered by the rule’s reference to foreseeability. The carrier
will not adjust its level of care in anticipation of unforeseeable losses—whether the term
“unforeseeable” is taken in its literal sense or used to refer to remote contingencies—
because the expected loss is either insensitive to, or only remotely related to, the level of
care. Thus, within Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model, there is no benefit—in terms of a
higher level of precaution against higher losses—from holding the carrier liable for
consequential losses. The losses covered by the Hadley rule are in this way the type of
losses against which one might want to purchase insurance, but not the type of losses the
carrier should internalize for the sake of efficient precaution. Again, there would be no
reason for the parties to turn the carrier into an implicit insurance company, as would be
the case if expectation damages, not limited by the Hadley rule, were the default.
B. Zero Quantity and Legal Formalities
Ayres and Gertner say that the U.C.C. supplies different default rules for price
and quantity.18 If the parties fail to supply a price term, the U.C.C. says that the court
should imply a “reasonable price,” which will usually be the market price at the time of
delivery. If the parties fail to supply the quantity term, the U.C.C. says that the court
should not enforce the contract. Ayres and Gertner interpret this provision as a “zero
quantity default”: the court implies that the quantity will be zero and, also, though they
do not say this, that the buyer has no obligation to pay anything. For Ayres and Gertner,
the price default is plausibly a majoritarian rule and the quantity default is a penalty
default rule.
The reason that the zero quantity default is a penalty default rule, Ayres and
Gertner argue, is that it is clear that most parties who enter a contract would not agree to
zero quantity, which would defeat the purpose of having a contract in the first place. The
reason for zero quantity is that “it is cheaper for the parties to establish the quantity term
beforehand than for the courts to determine after the fact what the parties would have
wanted.”19

L.J. 615 (1990); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1547
(1999). Ayres and Gertner seem to agree; see Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra.
18
Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra at 95–96.
19
Id., 96.
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The problem with this argument is that the zero quantity default is not a default
rule at all; it is a legal formality.20 The U.C.C. says as much: section 2–201 is entitled
“Formal Requirements: Statute of Frauds.” The requirement that certain contracts be in
writing is a classic formality, and all that the zero quantity rule does is specify that
quantity (as well as a signature and reference to goods) must be in the writing. According
to the Official Comment, the drafters of the U.C.C. required a quantity term rather than a
price term because market prices, catalogs, and price lists provide an objective way to
prevent opportunism (e.g., a claim by the seller that the price is higher than what the
parties agreed to), whereas there is no similar objective check on claims that the asserted
quantity is different from what the parties agreed to. By contrast, section 2–305, which is
entitled “Open Price Term” is located in a different part of the U.C.C., a part entitled
“General Obligation and Construction of Contract.” Section 2–305 is a default rule.
Section 2–201 is not. And, as Ayres and Gertner agree,21 section 2–305 is a majoritarian
default rule.
Putting aside the drafters’ own understanding of what they were doing, we can see
why 2–201 is a legal formality by considering its purpose. Like all contract formalities,
the purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent people from fraudulently claiming that a
contract exists. Formalities make such fraud more difficult by forcing the fraudster not
only to perjure himself in court, but also to forge documents, which is riskier and more
difficult than perjury. At the same time, formalities are not supposed to be so burdensome
as to interfere with good-faith contracting. Forcing parties to supply a quantity term (and,
in fact, not the exact quantity, but a ceiling) would be a way of checking fraud without
also inhibiting contracting too much since parties will almost always have an idea of the
quantity involved.
One should also observe that the logic of section 2–201, as Ayres and Gertner
describe it, does not follow their model, but Fuller’s older theory. As they describe it, 2–
201 does not force parties to reveal information to each other by penalizing one party if
he or she does not; it forces parties to reveal information to courts by penalizing both
parties if they do not. Ayres and Gertner think that parties should be forced to include a
20

This was pointed out in W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. Cal.
Interdisc. L.J. 29, 37 (1993).
21
Albeit with some qualifications. See Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra.
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quantity term because the parties can more easily reveal their optimal quantity to the
court than the court can figure it out ex post. This might be true; but it is not related to
Ayres and Gertner’s model, where parties have private information about their valuations
vis-à-vis each other.
Legal formalities are not default rules: one cannot opt out of them or contract
around them. Either one satisfies them or one does not have a contract, and they apply
regardless of whether there is a gap somewhere in the contract. Default rules come into
play only if formalities are satisfied and a contract exists.
C. Unilateral Mistake and Other Contract Formation Rules
Ayres and Gertner have invoked formation doctrines as examples of default rules.
Consider this passage from a recent article:
For example, section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts allows a
contractor who is unilaterally mistaken about a basic assumption to void a
contract if “the other party had reason to know of the mistake.” The default
possibility of voidability is a penalty that the informed contractor can only avoid
by revealing information. Indeed, in a Hadley-like fact pattern, a carrier could
argue that a basic assumption of its promise to perform or pay damages was the
belief that the miller would only have foreseeably low damages. Any evidence
that the miller knew that it had high damages, but failed to correct the carrier's
mistaken assumption, might be grounds for voiding the carrier’s duty to pay
damages at all. A slightly expanded reading of the common law of mistake thus
can be seen as a penalty default to induce knowledgeable contractors to correct
the other side’s mistakes of law or fact.22
This is a puzzling argument. The mistake doctrine is not normally thought of as a default
rule because it does not fill a gap in an otherwise valid contract; it results in the
avoidance of the contract. In a classic mistake case, a contractor’s bid is much lower than
the bids of competing contractors, it reflects a mistaken calculation, and the party taking
the bid has reason to know that the contractor’s low bid results from a mistake. If the
offeree accepts the bid, the resulting contract would not have a gap: the price term is
filled in. The problem with the contract is not that it lacks a price or has any other gap; it
is that the price is “wrong.” The mistake doctrine does not fill a gap in an incomplete
22

Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1591, 1609–10
(1999) (footnotes omitted).
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contract; it operates on precontractual behavior, preventing the formation of a contract in
the first place.
In this way, the mistake doctrine is like doctrines against fraud as well; and,
indeed, like legal formalities, which require parties to reveal to each other whether they
want the agreement to be legally enforceable. None of these doctrines forces parties to
reveal the type of information analyzed in Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model—that is,
the value that the promisee attaches to performance and the cost of performance for the
promisor. Indeed, the unilateral mistake doctrine forces the promisee to reveal
information to the promisor about the promisor’s cost, not the promisee’s valuation.
But suppose that the mistake doctrine is thought of as a default rule, along the
following lines. The contract does not have a term specifying the parties’ obligations if
the contractor’s bid is based on a clerical error; courts apply a default rule that says that
the parties have no obligations if such is the case. In other words, the default rule
provides a certain term if a precontractual contingency—the clerical mistake—is not
mentioned in the contract. It’s worth emphasizing that it is not clear that this is an
accurate statement because it’s not clear that parties could contract out of this rule, but
let’s suppose that this is the case. Still, the mistake doctrine would surely be a
majoritarian default rule, if it is a default rule at all. Given that clerical errors are difficult
to avoid; that the party that receives the bid can easily detect a (major) clerical error by
comparing the bidder’s price with the prices offered by other bidders; and that the
recipient of the bid need not rely on the bid given that other bids are submitted, it would
make sense for the parties to agree in advance on a term that relieves the bidder of its
obligation if a clerical error results in a price that is substantially higher than the next
highest price.
D. Interpretive Presumptions
Another kind of rule is the interpretive presumption, like the contra proferentem
rule that a contract should be construed against its drafter. Ayres claims that this rule is a
penalty default.23 Is it?

23

Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, supra, at 587. See also Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing To
Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 389 (2004).
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An initial but probably unimportant problem with the view that it is a penalty
default is that the rule applies, at least formally, regardless of whether there is a gap in the
contract. Interpretive presumptions operate at step 3, when the court must interpret the
contract. Only if the court, applying interpretive rules, finds a gap at step 3, would it then
move on to step 4, and fill in the gap.
As an illustration, suppose that a contract involving a European party and an
American party lists a price of “100” but does not say whether the price is in euros or in
dollars. A court would (at step 3) resolve this ambiguity. It might apply the contra
proferentem rule, or it might use parol evidence, or something else. Once the ambiguity is
resolved in one way or another, the court’s inquiry is at an end. There is no gap, as there
would be if the parties had not stated the price in the contract.
Or as another illustration, suppose that a contract has an ambiguous statement
about whether the promisee can assign the contract. At step 3, the court might interpret
the ambiguous statement as an explicit term that forbids or permits assignment, or it
might interpret the ambiguous statement as meaningless or inapplicable (for example,
parol evidence reveals that it applied to other kinds of assignment than the one in
question in the dispute). In the latter case, the court finds a gap at step 3, so it can move
on to step 4 and fill it in using the U.C.C.’s default rule which permits assignability.
Nonetheless, one might plausibly argue that interpretive presumptions are
analytically the same as default rules even if they are placed in a separate doctrinal
category. An ambiguous term might be reinterpreted as a term that does not fully specify
obligations. In the first illustration, one might say that the price term is ambiguous
because the contract contains a gap—it does not say whether the price is denominated in
euros or dollars. The court fills this gap by using a default rule that provides for the term
that would benefit the party that did not draft the contract.
Even if this interpretation is correct, it does not establish that interpretive
presumptions like contra proferentem are penalty default rules. In any specific
application of the rule, the term chosen by the court may or may not reflect the interests
of the majority of the parties. In the first illustration, there is no reason to think that a
majority of American-European contract parties would prefer the price to be in euros
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rather than dollars. Nor is there any reason to think that the term contrary to the drafter’s
interests is the term that a minority (or majority) of contract parties would choose.
When we think again of Ayres and Gertner’s model, their assumption was that
(say) the buyer may belong to different types: a majority type and a minority type.
Stipulate that the sellers are identical. In this setting, a penalty default rule would provide
the term preferred by the minority type. The contra proferentem rule provides the term
preferred by the nondrafter. In Ayres and Gertner’s setup, the contra proferentem rule
would be a penalty default rule with the functions they assign to penalty defaults, only if
the majority type happens to be the party that drafts the contract. But there is no reason to
believe this; more likely, the seller drafts the contract or the buyer (of either type) drafts
the contract.24 Thus, the rule does not differentiate between types, as envisioned by the
Ayres and Gertner model; so the rule does not cause one type to opt out while saving the
other type transaction costs. There is a mismatch between the model and the function of
the interpretive presumption.
Further, if we must think of interpretive presumptions as default rules, then surely
they are majoritarian. The drafter has an advantage: she can sneak in favorable language.
But as a consequence the drafter may have trouble persuading the nondrafter to consent
to a contract. A natural solution to this problem is to agree that ambiguities will be
construed against the drafter. Similarly, sellers may have trouble persuading consumers
to agree to contracts for complex products that they do not understand unless the
consumers are assured that ambiguities will be construed against the sellers. It is hard to
imagine parties agreeing to the contrary rule—that ambiguities will be resolved in favor
of the drafter, and against consumers and insureds.
None of this is to deny that interpretive presumptions like contra proferentem
have information-forcing effects. As I have noted, majoritarian as well as penalty default
rules have these effects. The contra proferentem rule, for example, might encourage the
drafter to be more explicit and to provide more details about obligations. This may reduce
the chance that the other party will misunderstand the contract; it also may facilitate
judicial interpretation of the contract. Interpretive presumptions that favor consumers and
insureds encourage sellers and insurers to draft detailed and explicit contracts, which
24
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19

increases the chances that the less sophisticated party will understand her contractual
obligations. But these effects are not the subject of Ayres and Gertner’s model.
E. Section 2–210
Ayres and Gertner cite section 2–210 in a discussion of penalty default rules,
though it is not clear whether they claim that is an example of a penalty default rule or
not.25 Nonetheless, I will discuss it, if only to show that the majoritarian interpretation of
this rule and rules like it is more straightforward and plausible than the alternative
interpretations.
Section 2–210 says that a “party may perform his duty through a delegate unless
otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having his original
promisor perform or control the acts required by the contract.” The default thus has two
parts: (a) delegation permitted if the identity of the original promisor does not matter; (2)
delegation not permitted if the identity of the original promisor does matter. As is always
the case with a default rule, the parties can opt out, and prohibit delegation in the first
case or permit it in the second.
The majoritarian explanation for this rule is simple and intuitive. For the
promisor, the power to delegate has value, and thus he or she will normally want to have
it. This power is valuable because it allows the promisor to pay someone else to perform
on his behalf, which he will want to do if he can find someone else who will do it for a
low price or if he finds some better opportunity that conflicts with his initial promise. But
delegation is undesirable for the promisee if the value of performance turns heavily on
the unique abilities of the promisor and a normal damages remedy cannot fully
compensate the promisee for the shortfall. Thus, one would normally expect delegation to
be permitted when the performance is fungible, and not when the promisee cares about
the identify of the promisor.
Ayres and Gertner note that this rule may force a promisee to reveal the extent to
which he values the promisor’s performance, which information the promisor may use to
extract a higher price. To avoid paying the higher price, the promisee might refuse to
reveal his interest, and thus consent to an inefficient contract that permits delegation. But
25
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it’s not clear what follows from this observation. Perhaps Ayres and Gertner’s point is
that 2–210 is not a penalty rule, and for this reason may be objectionable. If so, then
clearly 2–210 must count as a majoritarian rule.
F. The Understandings of Legal Decisionmakers
I have said little about Test 3, which asks whether the reasoning of legal
decisionmakers reflect the considerations modeled by Ayres and Gertner. One way to
apply this test is to look at the reasoning given by decisionmakers rather than at the
doctrines themselves.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code, which is the source of many of Ayres and
Gertner’s examples, was designed by its guiding light, Karl Llewellyn, to reflect existing
business norms and customs. Llewellyn believed that the common law depended too
heavily on formal doctrinal distinctions that did not match business practice, and thus
forced parties to engage in unnecessary rituals to ensure that their agreements were
enforced properly, or else courts to engage in needless gyrations in order to extract
correct results from recalcitrant doctrine. Llewellyn thus used business practice as a
guide, and either made the U.C.C.’s default rules reflect practice, or else incorporated
vague standards that would allow courts to do this ex post.
This being so, it would be surprising if the U.C.C.’s default rules reflected
nonmajoritarian preferences. They would, only if business norms and customs themselves
cured the information asymmetries identified by Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model. But
this seems implausible. Business practices become norms because, as the term suggests,
they are normal—most people engage in them. Most people engage in them because they
are jointly profit-maximizing. This is the standard majoritarian approach to default rules.
The opposite view would hold that, say, two parties to a contract engage in some practice
in order to benefit a third party—and this behavior becomes routinized.
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2. Some Recent Cases
Seven cases contain citations to Ayres and Gertner’s original article, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts. Four of these citations are not relevant to the current
discussion,26 but three of them are interesting.
Harnischfeger Corporation v. Harbor Insurance Company27 involved a dispute
over the meaning of a clause in an excess insurance policy. The insured argued that the
excess insurer’s liability would kick in when the insured (which self-insured for the
primary amount) had paid out $3 million in claims and legal fees; the insurer argued that
its liability kicked in only after the insured had paid out $3 million in claims only. The
court held that the clause unambiguously favored the insurer’s interpretation and thus
rejected the insured’s invocation of the principle that ambiguities should be resolved
against insurers. The court noted in passing that “perhaps the interpretive principle [that
ambiguities should be resolved against insurers] could be recast as one requiring the
insurer to come forth with information in its possession but unknown to the insured,”
citing the Ayres and Gertner article.28 But then it said, “Wisconsin has not suggested this
understanding of its approach, perhaps because it doubts judicial ability to determine how
much information is optimal.”29 Thus, the court rejected the penalty default analysis.
American National Fire Insurance Company v. Kenealy30 was another insurance
dispute. The insurer had provided in a policy that changes in coverage of the insurance
(for a yacht) were valid only if approved by the insurer. When the insureds sought to
increase the geographic coverage of the insurance policy, the broker obtained this
expansion, but told them that the expanded coverage would continue for one year when
in fact the insurer authorized the expansion for only a few months. The yacht sank after
the expiration of the new coverage but before the one year period expired. The insurer
sought to avoid liability on the basis of the clause limiting coverage changes, but the
26

See Coronet Insurance Company v. GACC Holding Company, 1991 WL 172182 (N.D.Ill.); American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995). Another case—Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th
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court held in favor of the insureds because the broker was a proper agent with apparent
authority to bind the insurer.
The court rejected the insurer’s argument because the clause that conditioned
changes on approval by the insurer did not say that the insurer could not provide such
approval through its agents. Thus, the contract was silent on the issue of whether an agent
could bind the insurer, and the question for the court was whether the default rule should
put the burden on the insurer or the insured. The court noted that in some cases the
insurer is in a better position to monitor the agent, and in other cases the insured is in a
better position. It decided that the default should favor the insured—that is, the agent
binds the insurer unless otherwise agreed—because otherwise insurers may “strategically
withhold[] information as to what authority the agent actually has, and whether the
company is bound if an accident occurs.”31 Although the court cited Ayres and Gertner’s
article, the court did not have any concerns about the insurer having private information
about its valuation. The court apparently thought that insureds would assume that the
broker could bind the agent even if the law were otherwise. In effect, the court was
aligning the law with the uninformed expectations of insureds—perhaps because it
believed that the insurer, by using the broker in the first place, was in part responsible for
generating these expectations. It feared that if the default rule placed the burden on the
insured, the insured would not realize that the broker’s statements were not binding until
ratified by the insurer, and further that the insurer would have no incentive to clarify the
law in the contract. Whatever one thinks of this reasoning, it reflects traditional consumer
protection ideas, and is not an application of the Ayres and Gertner model.
Finally, in Burlington v. Indemnity Insurance Co.,32 the court had to decide
whether an “all risk” insurance policy provided coverage only for damage caused by
external events (such as storms) and not by “intrinsic” factors such as structural defects in
the property in question. Although it certified this question to a state supreme court rather
than deciding it, the court argued in passing that a default rule that all risk policies
covered intrinsic as well as extrinsic losses would be a penalty default rule. “On this
account, expanded coverage to the detriment of insurers in all-risk policies is justified
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Id. at 269.
332 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2003).
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since such expansions give insurers, who presumably have better knowledge of insurance
laws than do insureds, a powerful incentive to insert explicit language into policies,
thereby informing the insureds as to the precise scope of coverage.”33 Although the court
cited the Ayres and Gertner article, like the Kenealy court it relied on a different theory—
namely, that insureds do not understand their coverage, and that default rules should
reflect the expectations of the insureds rather than the jointly optimal terms.
It should also be noted that the court does not explain why a default rule that
stipulated expanded coverage would not be the majoritarian default. On the one hand,
insurers might be reluctant to cover intrinsic defects because of fears of moral hazard. On
the other hand, insureds are unlikely to distinguish externally caused and internally
caused losses—a loss is a loss—and be willing to pay for both. Indeed, the distinction
between external and intrinsic losses is at best a rough and ready one: when a storm
damages a structure, is the cause of the loss the “external” storm or the “internal” design
problems that rendered the structure unable to withstand the storm? Without knowing
more about the market, one cannot say with any confidence that one version of the
default rule or the other is majoritarian. But given that the court does not refer to private
valuations, differential transaction costs by type, the proportion of types, and so forth, it
could not have been applying the Ayres/Gertner model.
G. Summary
My survey of the law revealed no unambiguous penalty default rule. One might
argue that many of the ambiguous default rules are actually penalty default rules—that is,
they reflect the preferences of a minority rather than of a majority. But it is clear that the
self-understanding of courts is otherwise: courts almost always think of themselves as
choosing the rule that a majority would want. In addition, courts never take into account
factors relevant to the Ayres/Gertner model. Indeed, they rarely discuss the problem of
private information that is identified by that model—that individuals with high valuations
will try to hide this information—in the context of choosing or justifying default rules.
Thus, if some default rules are not majoritarian, the most likely explanation—putting
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aside the consumer protection defaults mentioned below—is that courts or the drafters of
the U.C.C. simply made a mistake about what the majority prefers.
Problems of private information appear in judicial discussions mainly in cases
involving consumer protection. Here, courts worry that consumers (or insureds) do not
understand the law, do not understand the terms of the contract that they sign, or do not
properly value the product that they purchase. A few default rules seem to be intended to
give the seller an incentive to explain the law to the consumer, or to provide explicit
terms in the contract, but the justification is mainly the traditional consumer protection
justification, according to which consumers are easily manipulated by sellers, not the
Ayres/Gertner concern with information externalities that arise because contracting
parties can be classified into heterogeneous types who attach different valuations to the
same product or service.
The rules of contract law that are most explicitly concerned with information
asymmetries are not default rules but interpretive presumptions, contract formation rules,
and—what we have not discussed so far—immutable rules such as the unconscionability
doctrine. All of these rules apply regardless of whether there are gaps, no doubt reflecting
courts’ concern that consumers may fail to understand the transaction even when the
contract is detailed, explicit, and (relatively) complete.34
In sum, two conclusions are worth highlighting. First, there are no penalty default
rules. Second, rules that seem designed to smoke out private information—legal
formalities, contract formation rules, and so forth—do not reflect the logic of Ayres and
Gertner’s Hadley model.
Conclusion: Why Are There No Penalty Default Rules?
Let me conclude with some speculation about why penalty default rules do not
exist. But initially, let me exclude one possibility—that the Ayres and Gertner model is in
fact wrong. The model—and their general point—are correct: within the confines of the
model’s assumptions, there may be good reasons for penalty default rules. The question,
34
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then, is why courts and legislatures have not endorsed this reasoning and created penalty
default rules.
One possible reason is that the Ayres/Gertner model has not yet been absorbed
into contract theory, but at some future point, after the ideas have been taught to enough
generations of students, the ideas will become a part of the general understanding of
contract law. Although one cannot know what the future holds, the early judicial response
suggests that this will not happen. Indeed, this response suggests that the problem with
the Ayres/Gertner analysis is that it is too complicated and indeterminate for judges to
use.
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have made a similar but more general argument
about default rules.35 They argue that courts do not create default “rules” that are specific
enough to have value for the parties because the parties have adequate incentives for
supplying optimal terms, even under asymmetric information, where signaling and
screening mechanisms can be used which, if not perfect, are better than anything that
courts could produce. Although the U.C.C. and the common law contain many default
“standards,” these standards are too vague to provide guidance for parties or courts. If
Schwartz and Scott are right that courts do not bother producing default rules, and tend to
enforce the terms that the parties supply and no more, then it would follow a fortiori that
there are no penalty default rules.
A final reason that penalty default rules do not exist may be that contract law
doctrine is not well suited for the types of information externalities identified by Ayres
and Gertner’s model. Contract doctrine is extremely general; it applies in diverse market
settings. Information externalities may be much more of a problem in some markets—
say, insurance markets—than others, and the appropriate response may be ex ante
regulations oriented to a particular market rather than general contract law. For example,
insurance markets are thought to be especially vulnerable to information externalities,
and here we have massive ex ante regulation, including price, term, and market access
regulation. Courts may feel that they should allow legislatures to identify information
externalities and enact appropriate laws, and that neither common law development nor
general commercial codes are appropriate for such problems.
35
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Indeed, common law courts have been remarkably passive about solving contract
externalities. Prior to the enactment of antitrust legislation, courts occasionally interfered
with restraints on trade. Occasionally citing public policy, courts strike down contracts
that are not themselves illegal but might further illegal conduct, but here legislation
comes first and identifies the illegal conduct. Contract formalities protect third parties
from fraudulent claims that they have entered contracts. And tort rules like the fraud
doctrine prevent the most obvious kind of externalizing behavior. Otherwise, contract
doctrines tend to enforce freedom of contract; most mandatory rules are paternalistic or
otherwise inexplicable from a conventional economic perspective. Ayres and Gertner’s
argument implicitly assumes that courts would use general doctrines of contract law in
order to deter parties from producing subtle information externalities that were first
identified by economists only thirty years ago. It is more likely that the century old
Hadley doctrine, like other doctrines of contract law, reflect judicial conjectures about the
hypothetical bargain—the jointly value maximizing terms that most parties would want.
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